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1 Department of Psychology, Assumption College, Worcester, MA, United States, 2 Department of Psychiatry, University
of Massachusetts Medical School, Worcester, MA, United States, 3 Department of Psychology, Brandeis University, Boston,
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Difficulty in social communication and interaction is a primary diagnostic feature of ASD.
Research has found that adolescents with ASD display various impairments in social
behavior such as theory of mind (ToM), emotion recognition, and social synchrony.
However, not much is known about the relationships among these dimensions of
social behavior. Adolescents with and without ASD participated in the study. ToM
ability was measured by viewing social animations of geometric shapes, recognition of
facial emotions was measured by viewing pictures of faces, and synchrony ability was
measured with a spontaneously arising interpersonal movement task completed with
a caregiver and an intentional interpersonal task. Attention and social responsiveness
were measured using parent reports. We then examined the relationship between ToM,
emotion recognition, clinical measures of attention and social responsiveness, and social
synchronization that arises either spontaneously or intentionally. Results indicate that
spontaneous synchrony was related to ToM and intentional synchrony was related to
clinical measures of attention and social responsiveness. Facial emotion recognition was
not related to either ToM or social synchrony. Our findings highlight the importance of
biological motion perception and production and attention for more fully understanding
the social behavior characteristic of ASD. The findings suggest that the processes
underlying difficulties in spontaneous synchrony in ASD are different than the processes
underlying difficulties in intentional synchronization.
Keywords: autism, theory of mind, emotion recognition, social synchrony, social motor skill
INTRODUCTION
Impairments in social interaction and communication and the presence of restricted and
repetitive behaviors (RRBs) are core features of autism spectrum disorder (ASD, American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013) but the specific processes underlying the disorder are not well
understood. Despite extensive research that has uncovered fundamental problems in development
of theory of mind (ToM, Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé, 1993; Peterson et al., 2012; Mathersul
et al., 2013; Wellman and Peterson, 2013; Kimbi, 2014), motor skills (Ghaziuddin and Butler,
1998; Pan et al., 2009; Fournier et al., 2010; May et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2018), and emotion
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recognition (Hobson, 1986; Celani et al., 1999) in individuals
with ASD, no one theory has been able to fully account for all
features of the disorder. In addition, much of the research reveals
a mix of both deficits and competencies in these abilities (e.g.,
Wellman et al., 2001; Harms et al., 2010; Gonzalez-Gadea et al.,
2013; Hutchins et al., 2016), perhaps a result of the heterogeneity
inherent across individuals. Part of the problem may be due
to reliance on methodological approaches that are not sensitive
enough for understanding complex, dynamic social interactions
that unfold over time. Furthermore, the role of rhythmicity and
social synchrony, which have been shown to increase feelings of
rapport, affiliation, and cooperation (Hove and Risen, 2009; Miles
et al., 2009; Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009), are under-explored
areas in ASD research. Research is needed that not only presents
stimuli and measures behavior dynamically in real time during
social exchanges but also evaluates the relationship among the
clinical, social cognitive, and synchrony variables.
Certainly, responding to social stimuli is a dynamic process
that changes from moment to moment during everyday
interactions. This sort of fluid exchange allows for not only
smoother interactions between people, but also for a mutual
understanding of the goals and perspectives of each party
involved. Therefore, conducting research in ways (a) to mimic the
fact that social tasks change in very complex and unpredictable
ways, and (b) to measure continuous ‘on-line’ adjustment of
behavior may provide new avenues for better understanding the
social behavior of those with ASD, especially the types of social
adaptation that is particularly problematic in more naturalistic
social situations. Below, we review research findings regarding
ToM, emotion recognition, and social synchrony in ASD that
provide the backdrop for the current research. We highlight ToM
research employing depictions of animated shapes (Abell et al.,
2000; Klin, 2000) that demonstrates the value of using dynamic
stimuli, and social synchronization research from a behavioral
dynamics perspective (Kelso, 1995) that illustrates the value of
time-series measures of social behavior.
ToM and ASD
One important cognitive ability that contributes to social
interactions and communication is ToM. ToM refers to the
ability to make judgments about another person’s mental state
on the basis of behavioral observation. This allows for a mutual
understanding that each individual has their own set of beliefs,
desires, and intentions that can be applied to create a meaningful
social interaction (Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1994). There is a
substantial body of research evidence that a ToM deficit or ToM
developmental delay is a fundamental feature of ASD (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1994; Reed, 1994; Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Peterson, 2002; Hamilton et al., 2007; Peterson
et al., 2012; Mathersul et al., 2013; Wellman and Peterson, 2013;
Kimbi, 2014). However, while many children and adults with
ASD have been found to perform poorly on verbal ToM tasks
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Reed, 1994; Hamilton et al., 2007),
children have been found to be equivalent to their typically
developing peers in emulating the intended actions of others
(Carpenter et al., 2001), and in helping tasks (Liebal et al., 2008),
suggesting perhaps those with ASD can make inferences about
another’s mental state. In addition, some higher functioning
individuals with ASD and Aspergers disorder have been reported
to succeed at ToM tasks (e.g., Bowler, 1992). More recently, some
researchers have disputed whether the social communication
and interaction problems evident in ASD stem from a core
impairment in ToM (e.g., Chevallier et al., 2012; Dufour et al.,
2013; Scheeren et al., 2013).
Frith and Happé (1994) have argued that the ToM account of
autism does not fully explain all the features of the disorder or the
heterogeneity across individuals (i.e., why some individuals are
able to succeed at ToM tasks) and have proposed that difficulties
in central coherence (the ability to integrate information
across local and global levels) may be a useful framework for
understanding ASD. On the other hand, in his 15-year review of
ToM research, Baron-Cohen (2001) concluded that a ToM deficit
is a core and universal feature of ASD. He argued that in spite
of isolated instances whereby some children and adolescents are
able to pass some ToM tasks, there is always a significant delay
in the development of ToM and difficulty in performing higher-
order ToM tasks persists. Similarly, other researchers have argued
that given the incredible heterogeneity evident in ASD, especially
with respect to executive functioning, it is not surprising that
isolated pockets of competency can be found even amidst the
rather pervasive ToM deficits (Gonzalez-Gadea et al., 2013;
Hutchins et al., 2016). Other research, which has demonstrated
the use of compensatory strategies in some individuals with
ASD (Livingston et al., 2018), provides another framework
for understanding some of the apparent inconsistencies in the
literature.
Still other researchers have questioned the sensitivity of some
measures of ToM to adequately assess the type of mentalizing
needed in daily life. For example, Abell et al. (2000) and Klin
(2000) have suggested that traditional ToM tasks may not be
sufficient measures of the type of social adaptation skills needed
in naturalistic social interactions. Instead, they had participants
complete a social attribution task after viewing animations of
geometric shapes based on Heider and Simmel (1944) films to
mimic the more implicit and dynamic processing required in
social interactions. Abell et al. (2000) found that high functioning
children with ASD made inaccurate mental attributions, even if
they successfully passed a traditional ToM task. Similarly, Klin
(2000) found that high functioning individuals with autism and
Aspergers disorder performed poorly on the animations task
despite successful completion of a traditional ToM task. This task
may be more sensitive than other types of ToM tasks because it is
a task that unfolds over time and requires “on-line mentalizing”
and thus makes the use of compensatory mechanisms less likely.
White et al. (2011) extended work regarding the animations task
and developed an objective, multiple-choice tool for assessing
ToM. They found it to be equivalent to subjective measures and
recommended its adoption for children and adults due to the fact
that it is faster to administer and more objective.
Other research (Gobbini et al., 2007) found evidence that
more cognitive assessments of ToM (e.g., traditional false belief
tasks) activate different brain regions than tasks in which
intentional attributions are made on the basis of perceived
actions (e.g., animations of geometric shapes), suggesting that
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the attribution of agency and mental states may not involve
a singular neural system. The false belief tasks activated the
anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate
cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), and the temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ) while the social animation tasks activated the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum
and inferior parietal lobule (IPL). This interpretation was also
confirmed by Zwickel et al. (2011) behavioral data which
revealed that those with ASD who had some intact foundational
social processing (perceiving agency of, and adopting the
visuo-spatial perspective of another) nevertheless were not
able to attribute mental states to others on the basis of that
information. Kimbi’s (2014) review of the literature similarly
revealed that performance was worse on implicit ToM tasks
compared to explicit tasks. Thus, it seems likely that the
discrepancies in ToM performance may be due to the attribution
of mental states involving different underlying mechanisms
than perceiving agency and adopting visuo-spatial perspective.
Some individuals with ASD may have intact mechanisms
for perceiving agency and visuo-spatial perspective but have
dysfunctional mechanisms responsible for the attribution of
agency.
Emotion Recognition and ASD
The ability to recognize and interpret the emotions of other
is another important dimension of social interactions and
communications. A number of research studies have reported
that the ability to recognize the emotions of others is disrupted
in ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Hobson, 1986; Bölte and
Poustka, 2003; Kuuskikko et al., 2009) but others have reported
that emotion recognition was not impaired (Prior et al., 1990;
Capps et al., 1992; Robel et al., 2004; Castelli, 2005). Harms
et al. (2010) reviewed the literature on facial emotion recognition
(FER) and suggest that the mixed research findings regarding
the existence of FER deficits in ASD can be explained by three
factors —demographic characteristics of the participants, task
demands, and the specific behaviors measured. In addition, they
concluded that some evidence suggests that the mechanisms used
for identifying facial expressions is different in those with ASD
than without. Thus, even though some individuals with ASD
may successfully complete some emotion recognition tasks, the
process of how they do so is different than those without ASD.
This conclusion was confirmed recently by Black et al.’s (2017)
review of the literature on emotion recognition in eye tracking
and electroencephalography (EEG) studies where the authors
concluded that visual processing of emotion is different in those
with ASD than without.
Social Synchrony and ASD
A less researched component of social interaction and
communication in ASD is associated with social motor
processes. This involves the coordination of body movements
during social interaction that become synchronized over time.
Bernieri et al. (1994) found that this sort of social synchrony
is an essential part of successful interactions because it is a
vital feature of interpersonal responsiveness, social rapport,
and other directedness. Some research evidence indicates
that social synchrony breaks down in ASD. For example,
synchronization of speech and gesture was found to be disrupted
in ASD (de Marchena and Eigsti, 2010), as was the timing of
facial mimicry (Oberman et al., 2009). In addition, Tordjman
et al. (2015) proposed that ASD is a disorder of biological and
behavioral rhythms and reported that some treatments using
melatonin (due to its role in regulating circadian rhythms) and
behavioral interventions based on synchrony have had promising
preliminary results as treatments for ASD.
It should be pointed out that interpersonal synchronization
can arise either intentionally when there is an explicit social goal
or spontaneously without conscious awareness when there is no
explicit goal (Schmidt et al., 2011). Research from a coordination
dynamics approach has expanded our understanding of the
relevance of social synchrony in ASD through its recording of
continuous time-varying measures of behavior as it unfolds and
using time-series analysis techniques to analyze the patterning,
structure, and strength of system components as they change over
time. Research using this methodology has found that school-
age children with ASD had lower social motor synchronization
abilities than controls (Fitzpatrick et al., 2013, 2017a). In
addition, Marsh et al. (2013) found that preschoolers with ASD
spontaneously synchronized their rocking chair movements with
a partner less often than controls.
Similarly, Fitzpatrick et al. (2016) found that adolescents with
ASD demonstrate less synchronization in both spontaneous and
intentional interpersonal coordination than adolescents without
ASD. This research is particularly noteworthy because using a
simple interpersonal task, namely, the rhythmic coordination
of hand-held pendulums, the researchers were able to employ
direct dynamical modeling that has been used to differentiate
other populations with social deficits. This task not only
revealed that dynamical models of intentional and spontaneous
motor synchronization could differentiate adolescents with and
without ASD, but findings also suggest that joint disruptions
in both spontaneous and intentional synchronization may be
a unique feature of the social difficulties in ASD. Research on
individuals with schizophrenia, for example, found spontaneous
synchronization was equivalent for individuals with and without
schizophrenia, but intentional synchronization was lower for
those with schizophrenia (Varlet et al., 2012). Del-Monte et al.
(2013) found a similar pattern of results with first-degree relatives
of individuals with schizophrenia.
Research Questions
As indicated above, the ability to attribute mental states based
on viewing another person’s behavior, the ability to recognize
and understand the emotions displayed in facial expressions,
and the ability to engage in spontaneous and intentional
synchronization of body movements all play important roles in
social interaction and communication. There is evidence that all
three of these dimensions of social action-based behavior appear
to be disrupted in ASD. However, the relationships among these
action-based behaviors are not well understood and the main
focus of this paper is to examine the relationship among these
variables. A lack of significant relationships among the variables
could indicate that ToM, emotion recognition, and social
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synchrony have independent underlying processes. Alternatively,
significant relationships between measures could indicate that
they either share underlying processes or a disruption in one may
lead to a disruption in another.
Previous research provides the basis for evaluation of
more specific predictions. With respect to ToM and emotion
recognition, Campbell et al. (2006) found that facial emotion
recognition and ToM were not correlated in typically developing
children, although perception of intention based on gaze was
correlated with ToM. They concluded that gaze processing and
ToM may share similar neural circuitry, but ToM and emotion
recognition are dissociable in typical development. While they
found poorer performance in both an animations ToM task
and facial emotion recognition task, they did not evaluate
the relations between face-processing and ToM abilities in the
adolescents with ASD. If ToM and emotion recognition abilities
represent independent developmental continuums, then one
would expect that emotion recognition and ToM should not be
correlated in our sample.
In terms of the relationship between synchrony and ToM,
Fitzpatrick et al. (2017b) found that social synchrony in children
was related to performance on false-belief ToM tasks, suggesting
these tasks may share underlying processes. Of interest here is
whether social synchrony and animation ToM tasks demonstrate
a similar relationship. In addition, our methodology provides a
more stringent evaluation of whether the relationship between
synchrony and ToM is different for spontaneous and intentional
synchronization. The relationship between social synchrony and
facial emotion recognition has not been previously evaluated. If
ToM and social synchrony share underlying circuitry, one would
expect that synchrony would not be related to facial emotion
recognition.
In addition, we compared performance of adolescents with
and without ASD on a ToM animations task and emotion
recognition task, and expected to replicate previous research
findings of Campbell et al. (2006). Namely, we expected that
adolescents with ASD would be less able to accurately make




The participants consisted of 18 adolescents paired with a parent.
Nine adolescents had a diagnosis of autism (8 males, 1 female,
average age 13.67 years, range 12–17) and nine were neuro-
typical (7 males, 2 females, average age 14.44 years, range 12–16).
The participants were matched for chronological age.
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 2011) was used to ensure subjects met the intelligence
requirement for inclusion. The WASI is a short reliable measure
of intelligence and is nationally standardized and we used the
matrix reasoning and vocabulary subtests. Intelligence was in the
normal range (85–115) for both groups but the WASI score of
the ASD group was slightly lower than the control group (see
Table 1).
Pre-screening procedures were used to ensure that
participants with ASD had been previously diagnosed with
ASD by a licensed clinical psychologist or medical doctor based
on DSM-IV_TR criteria (American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2000). The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule,
Second Edition (ADOS-2; Lord et al., 2012) was administered
to all participants to confirm diagnostic group membership.
The ADOS is a semi-structured, standardized assessment of
communication, social interaction, and play for individuals
referred because of possible autism. It is comprised of five
modules – a toddler module for children between 12 and
30 months of age, and four modules appropriate for use with
individuals of varying language levels and age; these range from
Module 1, intended for young children who are non-verbal or
using mostly single words, Module 2, intended for children of
any age who use phrase speech, Module 3, intended for verbally
fluent children and young adolescents, and Module 4, intended
for verbally fluent older adolescents and adults. The ADOS
subscores for communication, social interaction, and stereotyped
behaviors and restricted interests, as well as the communication
and social interaction total, are reported. Five participants were
administered Module 3 and 13 were administered Module 4. The
mean ADOS scores for the ASD group was significantly higher
than the neuro-typical group and confirmed group membership
(see Table 1).
Parents provided written, informed consent for children
to participate, parents signed releases to consent to video
recordings, and adolescents gave their assent to participate. The
study was conducted over two visits and the first visit took
approximately 3 h while the second visit took approximately
1.5 h. Participants received $50 for the first visit and $50 for
the second visit. The project was approved by the University
of Massachusetts Medical School Institutional Review Board
(IRB) and the Assumption College IRB. Participants were
recruited from local communities through print advertising,
a recruitment brochure, email, social media, and community
events. Recruitment material was posted on various community
and University of Massachusetts Medical School websites.
Clinical and Social Measures
There were two separate experimental sessions, completed
approximately 1-week apart. In the first session, screening for
medical and psychopathology was conducted. The appropriate
ADOS module based on participant language and developmental
level was administered, as were the WASI Matrix Reasoning and
Vocabulary Subtests. Both the ASD group and control group
completed the ADOS. The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS;
Constantino and Gruber, 2005), Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) Rating Scale IV (DuPaul et al., 1998), Child
Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach and Rescorla, 2001),
and Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: Rutter et al.,
2003) were completed by the parent. Each of these measures is
described below.
Social Responsiveness Scale
The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino and Gruber,
2005) is a 65-item rating scale that measures the severity of autism
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TABLE 1 | Participant characteristics and clinical phenotyping.
ASD (n = 9) Neuro-typical (n = 9) Group difference
Mean SD Mean SD t(16) p
CA (years) 13.67 1.94 14.44 1.13 −1.04 0.31
WASI vocabulary 52 10.99 63.78 6.72 −2.74 0.01
WASI matrix 49.78 7.12 55.44 8.75 −1.51 0.15
WASI IQ 101.78 13.84 117.22 13.15 −2.43 0.03
ADOS
Communication 3.11 0.93 0.22 0.44 8.44 <0.001
Social interaction 5.44 2.19 0.11 0.33 7.24 <0.001
Communication and social interaction total 8.56 2.92 0.33 0.5 8.33 <0.001
Stereotyped behaviors and restricted interests 2.0 1.41 0 0 4.26 0.001
SRS (t-score) 77.0 17.65 38.33 2.96 6.48 <0.001
ADHD inattention 285.70 29.68 276.14 19.43 0.81 0.43
ADHD hyperactivity 203.28 45.34 109.19 11.92 6.02 <0.001
ADHD total 488.99 67.91 385.33 28.81 10.46 0.001
SCQ 17.78 9.54 1.44 1.24 5.10 <0.001
CBCL
Social problems 5.78 3.99 0.67 0.71 3.78 0.002
Thought problems 6.89 2.15 0.11 0.33 9.34 <0.001
Attention problems 8.89 4.23 1.00 1.12 5.34 <0.001
Social relations 6.78 3.36 10.89 2.75 −2.84 0.01
ADHD 6.44 3.21 0.67 1.00 5.16 <0.001
spectrum symptoms as they occur in natural social settings. It
is appropriate for use with children from 4 to 18 years of age.
The SRS is completed by a parent in 15 to 20 min. It provides
a clear picture of a child’s social impairments, assessing social
awareness, social information processing, capacity for reciprocal
social communication, social anxiety/avoidance, and autistic
preoccupations and traits. We used the SRS t-score in the current
study.
ADHD Rating Scale IV
The ADHD Rating Scale IV (DuPaul et al., 1998) assesses
symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity and
is based on the DSM diagnostic criteria for attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder. The ADHD inattention, hyperactivity,
and total scores were used in the data analysis.
Child Behavior Checklist
The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach and Rescorla,
2001) is a parent-report questionnaire that provides a measure of
behavioral and emotional problems. In this paper, the following
subscales, related to ASD traits, were used: social problems,
thought problems, attention problems, social relations, and
ADHD.
Social Communication Questionnaire
The Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ: Rutter
et al., 2003) is a brief parent-report instrument to evaluate
communication skills and social functioning. It is appropriate
for use in children 4 years or older. The overall SCQ summary
scores was used in the data analysis.
Experimental Tasks and Procedure
In the second visit, three experimental tasks (social
synchronization, ToM, and recognition of facial emotions)
were completed. The spontaneous synchrony task was completed
at the start of the experimental session to prevent experimental
task demands from influencing performance and the order
of presentation of the in-phase and anti-phase intentional
synchrony trials was counterbalanced across participants.
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Berkeley,
CA, United States) running on a Dell computer was used to
present the stimuli for the ToM and emotional recognition tasks.
The data collected for this study was part of a larger
project investigating differences in spontaneous and intentional
synchronization abilities of adolescents with and without ASD
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2016). Here, we used three of the measures
from Fitzpatrick et al. (2016) as an index of synchronization
ability (circular variance for spontaneous, intentional in-phase,
and intentional anti-phase coordination, described below) and
analyzed the relationship between synchronization and clinical
psychopathology, and social skills measures (parental report and
experimental) not previously reported.
Experimental Tasks
Social Synchronization Tasks
The social synchronization tasks involved adolescent-parent
pairs swinging hand-held pendulums while the movement time-
series of the pendulums was recorded. During the spontaneous
synchrony task, participants looked at their partner’s pendulum
but were instructed to swing at their own comfortable tempo and
maintain that tempo throughout the trial. During the intentional
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synchrony task, participant pairs coordinated their pendulum
swinging with their partner in either an in-phase pattern (so
their pendulums were in the same portion of their cycles at the
same time) or anti-phase pattern (so that their pendulums were
in opposite portions of their cycles at the same time). Additional
details about the task and calculation of the synchrony measure
(circular phase variance) can be found in Fitzpatrick et al. (2016).
ToM Task
ToM was measured by having participants view Frith-Happé
animations of geometric shapes depicting ToM (social)
animations, goal-directed movements, or random movements.
The 12 animations originally used in Abell et al.’s (2000) study
were the stimuli, with four animations of each type. Responses
were measured with the objective multiple-choice test developed
by White et al. (2011) in which participants chose one of three
categories to rate the interaction in the film clip—no interaction,
physical interaction, mental interaction. The maximum score
for each animation type was 4. After the ToM animations,
participants were presented with two additional questions (MCQ
Feelings) to choose the adjective that best described the feelings
of the small and large triangles. The maximum score was 8,
corresponding to two possible correct answers for each of the
4 animations. The percent correct was calculated for the four
ratings (goal-directed, random, ToM, MCQ Feelings) and used
in data analysis.
Facial Emotion Recognition Task
Recognition of facial emotions was measured using a modified
Ekman 60 faces test (Ekman and Friesen, 1976), especially
designed for use in individuals with ASD. The participant was
instructed to watch a presentation of the stimuli from four picture
conditions (angry faces, fearful faces, neutral faces, and houses),
all presented in an oval cutout. A blocked design paradigm,
with eight items per block (1 repetition, somewhere at random
within block) was used. Participants were asked to respond
by pressing the space bar whenever the item was repeated—
there was always one per block. Blocks alternated between
ANGER, FEAR, NEUTRAL, HOUSE, and REST, with a rest block
separating all task blocks. Each active block was 20 s, each rest
block was 16 s, and there were two blocks per condition across
three runs. Reaction time was recorded and the number of hits
was calculated for the four picture conditions (anger, fear, neutral
faces, and houses).
Data Analysis
Diagnostic group (ASD, neuro-typical control) was a between-
subjects variable. Group differences in clinical and social
measures (ADOS, ADHD Rating Scale, SRS, SCQ, CBCL) were
evaluated with independent samples t-tests. Group differences in
ToM scores was analyzed with a 2 (diagnostic group; ASD, neuro-
typical control) × 4 (animations rating condition, goal-directed,
random, ToM, MCQ Feelings) mixed ANOVA. Diagnostic group
was a between-subjects variable and animations rating condition
was a within-subjects variable. Group differences in facial
emotion recognition was analyzed with a 2 (diagnostic group)× 4
(picture conditions (anger, fear, neutral faces, and houses) mixed
ANOVA. Diagnostic group was a between-subjects variable and
picture condition was a within-subjects variable.
In order to evaluate the relationship between spontaneous
synchronization and clinical and social measures (ADOS, WAIS,
ADHD Rating Scale, SRS, SCQ, CBCL, ToM, and emotion
recognition), bivariate correlations with circular variance during
the spontaneous coordination condition (i.e., the looking
condition) were conducted. Data from both groups (adolescents
with and without ASD) were included in these analyses to explore
the relationships evident across a broader range of skills. In
addition, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to further
explore the underlying relationships between these variables.
RESULTS
Group Differences in Clinical
Phenotyping
As seen in Table 1, independent samples t-tests revealed
significant group differences for all the clinical phenotyping
measures except for the ADHD Inattention scale. SRS, ADHD
Hyperactivity, SCQ, CBCL Thought Problems, CBCL Attention
Problems, and CBCL ADHD had the most significant differences
between groups.
Are There Group Differences in ToM?
A 2 (diagnosis group) × 4 (animations rating condition) mixed
ANOVA with a dependent variable of percent correct resulted in a
significant main effect of diagnosis group [F(1,15) = 4.6, p = 0.05,
η2 = 0.24]. Participants with ASD had lower scores (M = 63.45)
than controls (M = 77.73). Neither the animations condition nor
the interaction was significant. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons
that investigated the simple effects of the interaction revealed that
the group difference was largely accounted for by a significant
group difference on MCQ Feelings (p = 0.04, MDifference =−27.42,
see Figure 1). The group difference for goal directed movements
approached significance (p = 0.08, MDifference = −22.57) but
neither random nor ToM resulted in significant group differences
(p = 0.56 and p = 0.11 for random and ToM, respectively). In
addition, for the ASD group, random was significantly different
from MCQ Feelings (p = 0.05, MDifference = 34.72) but no
other animation conditions were significantly different from each
other. For the control group, there were no significant differences
in performance on any of the animation conditions.
Are There Group Differences in Facial
Emotion Recognition?
A 2 (diagnosis group) × 4 (picture condition) mixed ANOVA
with a dependent variable of number correct resulted in a
significant main effect of diagnosis group [F(1,16) = 9.19,
p = 0.008, η2 = 0.37]. ASD participants demonstrated less facial
recognition (M = 3.72) than the control group (M = 4.97).
The main effect of task approached significance [F(3,48) = 2.38,
p = 0.08, η2 = 0.13] and the interaction was not significant.
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons that investigated the simple
effects of the interaction revealed significant group differences for
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FIGURE 1 | Significant group differences in performance on the animations
task was due largely to significantly worse performance by adolescents in the
ASD group on the MCQ Feelings condition than control participants, no
significant group differences were found for the other animations conditions.
Participants in the ASD group were significantly better in the random
movements condition than the MCQ Feelings condition but the performance
of control participants was equivalent for all animations conditions.
FIGURE 2 | Participants with ASD performed worse than the control
participants in all three picture conditions with faces. Performance was
equivalent between groups for the pictures of houses.
all three faces conditions (p = 0.02, p = 0.008, p = 0.03, for the
fear, angry, and neutral faces) but not for the houses (p = 0.43,
see Figure 2). A 2 (diagnosis group) × 4 (picture condition)
ANOVA with a dependent variable of reaction time did not result
in any significant main effects for diagnosis group [F(1,16) = 2.65,
p = 0.12, η2 = 0.14] or task [F(3,48) = 1.63, p = 0.20, η2 = 0.09].
The interaction was also not significant [F(3,48) = 0.06, p = 0.98,
η2 = 0.004].
Relationship Between ToM and Emotion
Recognition
The correlations between the two ToM tasks (ToM animations,
MCG Feelings) and emotion recognition tasks (Fear and
Angry displays) were of interest. As seen it Table 2, none of
these correlations were significant. There was one significant
correlation between one ToM control task (GD ToM) and one
control emotion recognition task (neutral face).
TABLE 2 | Correlations (N = 18) between ToM (percent correct) and emotion
recognition (hits).
Emotion recognition
Fear Angry Neutral Houses
TOM
GD 0.26 0.04 0.57∗ −0.07
Random −0.34 −0.39 −0.005 −0.25
ToM 0.19 0.31 0.44 0.34
MCQ feelings 0.35 0.27 0.36 0.07
∗p = 0.02.
Relationship Between Synchronization
and Other Measures of Social
Functioning
Spontaneous Coordination
Circular phase variance during spontaneous entrainment was
significantly correlated with WASI Vocabulary and WASI IQ,
but there were no other significant correlations with any other
clinical measures (see Table 3). Circular phase was significantly
correlated with two of the ToM conditions, GD and MCQ
Feelings, but not with random or ToM. Circular phase variance
during spontaneous entrainment was not significantly correlated
with any of the emotion recognition tasks.
Intentional Coordination
In order to evaluate the relationship between intentional
synchronization and more traditional measures of social skills
(clinical scales and experimental measures of ToM and emotion
recognition), a composite score of circular phase variance for
all three pendulum conditions was calculated for both in-
phase and anti-phase. Bivariate correlations were conducted
with circular phase in-phase and anti-phase composite scores.
As seen in Table 4, either intentional in-phase or anti-phase
circular phase variance was correlated with WASI Vocabulary,
Matrix, or IQ. However, there were significant correlations
with the CBCL measures (Social Problems, Thought Problems,
Attention Problems, Social Relations, and ADHD) and SRS
for both in-phase and anti-phase. In addition, there were
significant correlations with the ADOS communication and
social interaction subscales, but not the stereotyped behaviors
and restricted interests. The correlations were also significant
for ADHD hyperactivity and SCQ was correlated with anti-
phase synchronization but not in-phase. MCQ Feelings was
significantly correlated with in-phase synchronization but
no other ToM or emotion recognition correlations were
significant.
Factor Analysis
In order to determine whether there were latent factors
or components underlying the correlations between
variables measuring different aspects of social abilities, a
principal components factor analysis was conducted. We
included variables that measured a range of behaviors
that successfully differentiated the groups in the previous
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TABLE 3 | Correlations (N = 18) between unintentional and intentional synchronization and clinical measures.
Spontaneous entrainment Intentional coordination
In-phase Anti-phase
r p r p r p
WASI vocabulary 0.48 0.04∗ 0.20 0.43 0.18 0.48
WASI matrix 0.39 0.11 0.07 0.77 −0.02 0.95
WASI IQ 0.49 0.04∗ 0.17 0.51 0.12 0.65
ADOS
Communication −0.32 0.20 −0.54∗ 0.02 −0.58∗∗ 0.01
Social interaction −0.41 0.096 −0.49∗ 0.04 −0.43 0.07
Communication and social interaction total −0.38 0.12 −0.51∗ 0.03 −0.49∗ 0.04
Stereotyped behaviors and restricted interest −0.17 0.52 −0.28 0.28 −0.30 0.24
SRS (t-score) −0.21 0.41 −0.62∗∗ 0.006 −0.65∗∗ 0.003
ADHD inattention 0.31 0.21 −0.39 0.11 −0.45 0.06
ADHD hyperactivity −0.13 0.61 −0.61∗∗ 0.007 −0.68∗∗ 0.002
ADHD total 0.003 0.99 −0.61∗∗ 0.007 −0.69∗∗ 0.002
SCQ −0.06 0.81 −0.45 0.06 −0.57∗∗ 0.01
CBCL
Social problems −0.13 0.61 −0.69∗∗ 0.002 −0.67∗∗ 0.002
Thought problems −0.32 0.19 −0.58∗∗ 0.01 −0.65∗∗ 0.003
Attention problems −0.22 0.39 −0.54∗ 0.02 −0.61∗∗ 0.008
Social relations 0.14 0.58 0.68∗∗ 0.002 0.71∗∗ 0.001
ADHD −0.23 .35 −0.82∗∗ <0.001 −0.76∗∗ <0.001
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 4 | Correlations (N = 18) between unintentional and intentional synchronization and ToM and emotion recognition.
Spontaneous entrainment Intentional Coordination
In-phase Anti-phase
r p r p r p
ToM animations (percent correct)
GD 0.50∗ 0.04 0.04 0.88 0.10 0.72
Random 0.02 0.95 −0.16 0.55 −0.14 0.61
ToM 0.23 0.37 0.01 0.96 −0.06 0.83
MCQ feelings 0.63∗∗ 0.007 0.48∗ 0.05 0.36 0.15
Emotion recognition (hits)
Fear 0.33 0.18 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.47
Angry 0.18 0.48 0.39 0.11 0.31 0.22
Neutral 0.40 0.10 −0.06 0.81 0.03 0.90
Houses 0.22 0.38 0.08 0.74 0.08 0.76
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
analyses—intentional synchronization ability (anti-phase
circular phase), unintentional/spontaneous synchronization
ability (circular phase during the looking condition), intelligence
(WASI IQ), communication ability (ADOS Communication
and Social Interaction), attention (CBCL ADHD), social
responsiveness (SRS), and ToM (MCQ Feelings). Some behaviors
were measured multiple ways so we chose the measure that best
differentiated the groups for inclusion in this analysis.
The performed factor analysis satisfied several adequacy
criteria. First, all items correlated at least 0.4 with at least
one other item, suggesting reasonable factorability. Second,
the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was
0.79 (above the recommended value of 0.5), and Bartlett’s
test of sphericity was significant [χ2(21) = 67.03, p < 0.001].
Additionally, the communalities were all above 0.5, confirming
that each item shared some common variance with other items.
A principal components factor analysis using varimax
(orthogonal) rotation found that the three factors explained
87.26% of the variance. The loadings less than 0.40 were excluded.
The results of this solution are shown in Table 5. Four items,
the intentional synchronization, communication, attention, and
social responsiveness loaded onto factor 1 and explained 40.18%
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of the variance. This factor seems to be indexing social action
and attention aspects of social skills. Being able to intentionally
coordinate one’s action, communicate effectively, and respond
appropriately to others, different dimensions of more explicit
social action, may share some underlying similarities and are
all related to attention. Two items, ToM and spontaneous
synchrony, loaded onto factor 2 that explained and additional
24.08% of the variance. This factor seems to be indexing more
implicit social knowledge that arises from viewing actions (in the
case of ToM) or performing actions with another person. The
ToM task measures how well the individual understands the goals
of others and this kind of knowledge similar to what is necessary
for smoothly and naturally coordinating one’s movements
with another during joint actions. Interestingly, the intentional
synchrony measure loaded on the social action factor while
spontaneous synchrony loaded on a separate factor, suggesting
that intentional and spontaneous synchrony may contribute to
social interactions in different ways and perhaps have different
underlying mechanisms. The final factor was comprised of
three items, IQ, communication, and social responsiveness, and
explained an additional 22.99% of the variance. This factor could
be characterized as social communication and seems to involve
somewhat higher order cognitive abilities. In contrast, social
action appears to depend more on attention processes.
DISCUSSION
Overall, our results indicated that adolescents with ASD had
difficultly ascribing appropriate feelings to ToM animations,
although they were equivalent to controls in their ability to detect
that a mental state was represented in the ToM animations.
In addition, adolescents with ASD performed worse than the
controls on facial emotion recognition in terms of accuracy
but their reaction times were similar to controls. Interestingly,
we found significant relationships between both spontaneous
and intentional synchrony and the ability to accurately ascribe
feelings in the ToM animations. Intentional synchrony was
also related to autism severity, social responsiveness, and
attention. In contrast, facial emotion recognition was not
correlated with spontaneous or intentional synchrony, nor was
emotion recognition related to ToM performance. Furthermore,
the principal components analysis resulted in intentional and
spontaneous synchrony loading on different factors, suggesting
these two types of synchronous behavior tap into different
TABLE 5 | Principal components analysis.
Component 1 2 3




Communication ability 0.60 0.66
Attention 0.89
Social response 0.82 0.44
dimensions of social skill that might have different underlying
mechanisms. Our findings suggest intentional synchrony shares
mechanisms with attention, social communication, and social
responsiveness while spontaneous synchrony shares mechanisms
with ToM. Facial emotion recognition appears to be dissociated
from both of those aspects of social behavior.
Our findings replicated Campbell et al. (2006) in that we
also demonstrated that adolescents with ASD have difficulty in
perceiving feelings based on movement and recognizing emotion
in facial expressions. We also demonstrated that in our sample of
adolescents with and without autism, there was no relationship
between ToM and emotion recognition. This is consistent with
other research (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Mazza et al., 2014;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Pino et al., 2016) that has proposed
that the cognitive component of ToM (understanding the mental
state of others) and the emotional component (making inferences
about someone’s emotional state) may not involve a singular
process. Of interest is whether a different sort of ToM task, such
as the reading the mind in the eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997,
2001), would display the same pattern of results. The reading
the mind in the eyes test has been extensively researched and
found to be a reliable measure of ToM (Fernández-Abascal et al.,
2013; Vellante et al., 2013) for both males and females with
ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015). It is also possible that the static
nature of the facial emotion recognition task lacked the resolution
necessary to uncover potentially subtle relationships. Additional
research is needed to further explore these alternatives.
Facial emotion recognition was also not related to social
synchrony. The lack of a relationship between facial emotion
recognition and social synchrony could implicate the ‘online’
processing that is required in tasks that change continuously
over time. That is, the emotion recognition task involved a static
display, as mentioned above, and both synchronization tasks
and the ToM task involved dynamic tasks that were changing
over time. Of interest is whether the dynamic, time-dependent
processing that was required in those tasks is the salient issue
for understanding the social challenges experienced by those
with ASD. However, more research is needed to verify that
the same pattern emerges for emotional recognition tasks that
utilize dynamic displays rather than the static facial displays used
here. It could be that processing social information as it unfolds
over time utilizes a different set of mechanisms than processing
social information from static displays. Alternatively, it could be
that facial emotion recognition involves neural processing that
is distinct from the processing necessary for attributing mental
states or synchronizing one’s movements with another person
spontaneously or during joint tasks.
The relevance of motion perception for both making social
judgments (as in the case of ToM) and physically engaging
in social interactions (as in spontaneous synchronization) is
highlighted by the correlations between ToM and spontaneous
synchronization and the principal components analysis loading
those items together. This finding is also consistent with other
research that found that individuals with ASD have trouble
detecting aspects of biological motion in point-light displays.
For example, individuals with ASD demonstrate deficits in their
ability to recognize both emotion and motion as presented in
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point-light displays (Nackaerts et al., 2012) and a link between
social cognition and the perception of biological motion that
may be dependent on the severity of ASD (Nackaerts et al.,
2012; Miller and Saygin, 2013) has been proposed. Adolescents
with autism have also demonstrated the inability to identify
the directional movement of a point-light walker performing a
consistent motion, leading to the conclusion that there is an
overall deficit of perception of biological motion in ASD (Pavlova,
2012). Perhaps the deficit in perception of biological motion is
the fundamental problem that results in difficulties in ToM tasks
as well as engaging in social synchrony. This raises interesting
possibilities for further research to explore if there is common
neural circuitry underlying all the tasks.
Also noteworthy is the finding that perception of feelings in
the ToM animations was related to spontaneous synchrony but
not intentional synchrony. This is consistent with Fitzpatrick
et al. (2017b) who also found ToM in children was related to
spontaneous synchrony. In contrast, intentional synchronization
loaded with communication, social responsiveness, and
attention. The correlational nature of this research does not
allow us to determine whether one of these factors is driving
the disruptions in the others. It might be the case, for example,
that the social problems in intentional synchronization,
communication, and social responsiveness are actually the result
of a general attention processing impairment (Hayes, 1987;
O’Riordan et al., 2001), a problem with attention switching
(Landry and Bryson, 2004), or an inability of social stimuli to
capture attention (Klin et al., 2003; Schultz, 2005; Chawarska
et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2014). Alternatively, it could be the
case that there is some other underlying mechanism responsible
for the difficulties in synchronization, attention, communication,
and social responsiveness. Additional research is needed to
disentangle these alternatives.
Nevertheless, the finding that spontaneous and intentional
synchrony are related to and load with different social variables
raises the interesting possibility that intentional coordination
involves different social processes and underlying neural circuitry
than spontaneous coordination. Intentional synchrony may be
related to the more cognitive component of social understanding
as proposed by Baron-Cohen et al. (2015) and others (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2009; Mazza et al., 2014; Pino et al., 2016) and
implicates attention as a variable for further exploration. Our
findings that spontaneous synchrony and ToM were not related
to emotion recognition suggest that perhaps there is another
social processing module that is related to biological motion
perception and production. This could mean that in addition
to cognitive and emotional components as previously proposed,
perhaps there is a social movement component as well.
Identification of a singular mechanism that is able to
fully account for all the features of ASD as well as the
heterogeneity across individuals has been elusive. The pattern of
interrelationships demonstrated in our data is consistent with
a more modular account of social behavior characteristic of
ASD that involves cognitive, emotional, and social movement
components that should be investigated in future research.
If the different social processing modules are dissociable, it
is possible that an individual has disruptions in one set of
processes but not the others. This seems likely given the
range of social and communication abilities demonstrated by
those with ASD across the spectrum. We speculate that the
addition of a social movement component to understanding
ASD not only could help explain some of the assets as well as
difficulties in social communication and interaction, but also
could provide a link for helping to explain the other main
diagnostic feature of ASD, the production of RRBs. For example,
some researchers have found that RRBs in ASD may function to
create rhythmicity, which is sometimes disrupted in individuals
with ASD (Tordjman et al., 2015). In addition, some initial
evidence (Lampi et al., 2016) has demonstrated that high levels
of RRBs were associated with poorer synchronization ability in
children, and this relationship remained significant even after
controlling for non-verbal ability. We propose that a link between
RRBs and social synchrony provides a potential pathway for
understanding the two diagnostic features of RRBs and future
research is needed to explore this possibility.
Limitations
Several limitations of this research should be acknowledged. First,
these findings are preliminary since this is one of the first studies
to examine social synchrony in adolescents. Additional research
is needed utilizing larger sample sizes with a wider range of
social (synchrony, communication, and social responsiveness),
cognitive, and emotional abilities to more fully understand the
continuum of ASD traits and relationships among them. In
addition, ASD diagnosis was comorbid with attention problems
in our sample. Future research is needed to evaluate the
relationships among social, cognitive, and emotional abilities
in both adolescents with and without ASD who have attention
problems as well as those who do not. Finally, social interactions,
especially the sorts of physical interactions found in social
synchronization, are the result of reciprocal interactions between
people. Future research is needed to investigate the reciprocity
of coupling between the adolescent and their partner to more
fully understand the contribution each makes to the observed
behavior.
CONCLUSION
Our preliminary findings highlight the relevance of being
able to attune to social information displayed in biological
motions in a timely fashion during an ongoing task and
being able to use that information to make attributions
about feelings for understanding the social communication and
interaction problems inherent in ASD. The research reported
here extends our understanding of the relationship between
various dimensions of social behavior (ToM, facial emotion
recognition, social synchrony) that have not previously been fully
explored. Namely, we found that spontaneous synchrony was
related to ToM while intentional synchrony was related to clinical
measures of attention and social responsiveness. Facial emotion
recognition was not related to either ToM or social synchrony.
Additional behavioral research with a larger sample size is needed
to systematically evaluate static and dynamic measures of ToM,
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facial emotion recognition, and social synchrony in those with
and without comorbid attention problems to be able to assess
the importance of these findings. A further step will involve
investigating whether any of these processes share underlying
neural circuitry.
Overall, our findings suggest that methodologies that
investigate the ‘process’ of social interactions unfolding hold
much promise for providing measures with heightened
resolution to better identify the essential qualities of social
performance in naturalistic situations and isolate underlying
mechanisms that may be disrupted in ASD. Such research holds
promise for identifying the processing modules that can account
for the full range of behaviors characteristic of ASD.
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